Reputation in Marketing Channels: Repeated-Transactions

Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty Technical Appendix: The Proofs
In this appendix we prove the lemmas and propositions stated in Appendix 2. The proofs focus primarily on the parties' first period strategies. This is because the second period strategies are so simple. Recall that in the second period the parties' optimal strategies are as outlined in §2 when both seller and buyer are myopic. That is, the buyer accepts any offer up to his valuation; if the seller's cost is low she offers if optimistic and v if pessimistic; and whatever the buyer's reputation, the seller offers v if her cost is high. ), about S's cost on his expected payoff. This is key because, as the results of §2 show, S's period 2 offer will vary depending on her cost. If S's cost is high, then the second period offer will be v . If S's cost is low, then the second period offer will be v if , and it will be if provides B with a payoff at least as large as any that he can expect should he reject it. Rearranging terms shows that any
• satisfies Cdn. (A.9). Clearly, then, if
• the (high valuation) buyer accepts, i.e., for .
But suppose that and that for this price , the former of which is ruled out by assumption and the latter is a contradiction (if S's cost is high B cannot know that her cost is low). Therefore, ( )
, which means offering a price below her cost is strictly dominated for a high cost seller.
We now consider >κ p (we now know that we need not consider any ). To prove that a high cost S offers no price below , the key is to show that B will accept if a high cost S is willing to offer it because his posterior belief is at least as large as his prior belief.
Assume that is not dominated by any higher first period c Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for calling this, the most direct route to proving this part of the result, to our attention.
offer for a high cost S. Then, if , B's updated belief is at least as large as his prior, i.e., b , unless o is dominated by some lower price for a high cost S. But as
for implies that (see Eqns. (5) and (A.8)), by Proposition 1 we know that B accepts . So, no lower price can dominate for a high cost S since no such price can be accepted with any larger probability by a high valuation B, the only type B with which a high cost S can trade. Hence, a high cost S never prices below and, having already shown that she never prices below cost, we have proved that she never prices below
(ii) To prove that on seeing any
B concludes that S's cost is low, we show that only a low cost seller is willing to offer such a price. We know by part (i) that for a high cost S any is dominated by any higher offer no matter how B responds to the lower or the higher offer and that it cannot benefit her to offer any since B will accept if she is willing to offer it. We proceed by showing that a low cost S may be willing to offer even if a high valuation B is certain to accept . Then we show that if B is not certain to accept , which implies that even if B were certain to accept it would be dominated by some higher offer for a high cost S (recall that, by part (i), B accepts unless it is dominated by some higher offer for a high cost S), a low cost S may be willing to offer some
. A low cost S's payoff from take-the-surething, i.e., offer , is
, and her expected payoff from offering is 
, where is the probability with which B accepts ′ . Comparing this payoff with a low cost S's payoff from (which is an offer that we have established her willingness to make) reveals that 
, a low cost S is willing to offer such ′ . We have thus shown that there exist conditions under which a low cost S will choose and conditions under which she will choose
. Having shown in part (i) that there are no conditions under which a high cost S offers any , we have established that only a low cost S can benefit from making any such offer. The Intuitive Criterion is therefore invoked to assign zero weight to the likelihood that any is offered by a high cost S. Hence, on seeing any such offer, B concludes that S's cost is low, i.e., (ii) Given that the buyer is certain to accept , it is clear that no
is optimal for either seller type whatever the buyer's reputation. Then, we need only compare an optimistic low cost seller's payoff from , 
for all such prices (this has no effect on S's strategy).
(ii) The condition that defines a very pessimistic S is ( ) ( ) ( ] 
, as from any of the latter she gets trade with positive probability and non-negative profit. Hence, if credible, B's threat to reject all renders all such prices suboptimal for both S types and, therefore, zero probability prices. Since both S types will consider if B accepts with large enough probability, we cannot
invoke the Intuitive Criterion to assign zero weight to either S type when . So for any such price
meaning that , and, by Corollary 1, ) 1 1 = p for these zero probability prices (with no effect on S's strategy).
(iii) The condition that defines moderate pessimism is ( ) )
with sufficiently large probability. That is, a moderately pessimistic low cost S is willing to set any price that a high cost S is willing to set, given that B accepts the price with large enough probability.
(a) The situation here is that . 
. Then, by the definition of moderate pessimism, is also optimal for a low cost S, and
We have established B's beliefs on observing and best responses to lower prices in Lemmas 1 and 2.
(b) Here the situation is that . Proving this part of the lemma involves several steps. We must first
show that B's optimal strategy is such that no is optimal for a low cost S. Second, we must show that B's strategy must make v the optimal price for a high cost S but not for a low cost S, which imposes an upper bound on the probability with which B can accept . Last, we must show that the lower limit on the probability with which B optimally accepts v is positive.
s optimal strategy is such that some is optimal for both S types. Then, for that price
1
. By Corollary 1, we know
for any such price, a contradiction, as a pessimistic low cost S does better with than she does with any price certain to be rejected. It is clear that the
d Note, however, that if the seller's belief is at the boundary of moderate pessimism, i.e., if , then if her cost is low, the seller's payoff from take-the-sure-thing equals her expected payoff from learn-then-discriminate by offering . In such an instance, a low cost seller may randomize her first period offer, i.e., she may choose either v or , both with positive probability. Therefore, if , an offer of need not necessarily be a pooling offer, and the buyer's updated belief on observing it falls somewhere in the interval bounded below by the prior, b (the buyer's updated belief if the offer is pooling), and bounded above by 1 (the buyer's updated belief if the offer is separating). But even if , the buyer's optimal strategy is unaffected. Because his updated belief is at least as large as his prior on observing , it is still optimal for him to accept. Most important, however, is that his updated belief on observing offers higher than is unaffected. That is, for , the updated buyer belief is the same as his prior because either type of seller would make such an offer if he accepts with sufficiently large probability. His updated belief on observing any supports the optimality of rejecting any such offer. In any event, the case of can be considered special, and as such we relegate its consideration to Proposition 4, which deals with all such special cases.
same argument holds for any strategy such that any is optimal for a low cost S but not for a high cost S, as then b , yielding the same contradiction. We have thus shown that if , moderate pessimism implies B's optimal responses to all makes all such prices suboptimal for a low cost S.
We now show that B's strategy must make v the optimal price for a high cost S. Suppose that B's best responses to are such that some
is optimal for a high cost S. Then, as all are suboptimal for a low cost S, for any such price we have
, implying that and, by Proposition 1, that
any such price. This is a contradiction, as, by the definition of moderate pessimism, B's certain acceptance of any price that a high cost S is willing to set makes such a price optimal for a low cost S as well, and we have already
shown that no such price can be optimal for a low cost S. B's optimal strategy must, therefore, render all ) p 1 suboptimal for both seller types. Therefore, as some must be optimal for a high cost S, it must be the case that the optimal strategy for B must be such that ( * 1 p . Further, since a low cost S must not be tempted to offer this price, by the definition of , we know that ( * 1 y for . Then, we have
required.
We conclude our examination of B's optimal strategy by showing that ( ) 0 1 1
optimally rejects with certainty. Then a high cost S, anticipating his response, prices a bit lower than v .
This reveals to B that S's cost is high since a moderately pessimistic low cost S chooses no such price, and we have . Then , which implies that 
We have determined that all such prices must be suboptimal for both seller types. We also know that if B accepts with large enough probability, either moderately pessimistic S type is willing to choose prices from this range. So, we cannot use the Intuitive Criterion to place zero weight on either type if such a price is observed. We assume that any such price yields no information about S's type, i.e.,
e Therefore, they all exceed and, by
Corollary 1, for all such prices. This renders all of them suboptimal for both S types, as required. 
• p PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. The fundamental logic of Corollary 2 is owed to Fudenberg and Tirole (1983, pp. 224 -225) for . We extend their logic, however, for the case of .
First, note that by the definition of , if the buyer's response to any is , then the seller's posterior belief is if the outcome is rejection. A low cost seller is then indifferent between offering and v in the second period. Next, note that for a mixed strategy to be optimal for the buyer, it is necessary that he be indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer. So let
be the probability with which an indifferent low cost seller offers in period 2. The buyer is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in period 1 if
And from Eqn. (A.11) we get the period 2 strategy of a low cost seller that yields buyer indifference in period 1.
Call that strategy .
( ) That is, whatever the observed outcome, S remains optimistic and whatever her cost. As such, B should accept the first period price with certainty, a contradiction. Hence,
But suppose that . This means that a low cost S or both S types expect that pricing at v is at least as profitable as any other strategy. So, given that
, if B's best response to is some , S reduces her price ever so slightly to exploit the fact that B accepts any lower price with larger probability. Such a reduced price yields a positive surplus for B while not violating the conditions necessary for him to optimally play a mixed strategy (see Eqns. (A.11) and (A.12)). Accepting v with probability yields the reservation utility, 0, for B, so it is clear that
. Note that this situation is similar to the case of and, for the same reason, we will ignore this result (i.e., S can price arbitrarily close to ).
Therefore, for all
Finally, we consider the situation when and show that in this situation . By the definition of , means that a high cost S finds an optimal price and a low cost S does not. Therefore, for . This implies that v is dominated by some lower price for a low cost S when B's response to is . Suppose that B's optimal strategy is such that some is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low cost S. Then, for such a price we have
, which means that . Then, however, this price is also optimal for an optimistic low cost S, as an optimistic low cost S is willing to set any price that a high cost S is willing to set if B is certain to accept such a price, a contradiction. Hence, when S is optimistic B's optimal strategy must be such that no is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low cost S, i.e.,
when S is optimistic. Therefore, it cannot be the case that for , as such a response makes it optimal for a high cost S but not a low cost S to price
e Such uninformed off the equilibrium path beliefs have been called "passive conjectures" (Fudenberg and Tirole [1983] ), and we use passive conjectures frequently in this analysis. We should point out, however, that there are other ways of modeling such off the equilibium path beliefs (interested readers should see Cho and Kreps [1987] ; Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] ). just lower than v , which we have ruled out. (If a low cost S is unwilling to price at v when B's response is , she cannot be willing to set any lower price when B's response to that price is ).  when v is accepted with probability , even if is certain to be accepted (recall that is always accepted with certainty).
To prove this part of the lemma we need to show that B's optimal strategy must be such that no
v is optimal for either S type, from which it follows that is optimal for both S types given the above-stated relationships between the payoffs. We will then show that B's best response to S's optimal price, , is unique.
We first establish that if a high cost S is not indifferent between offering v and . Let so that a high cost S's expected payoff from equals that from when the response to the former is and the latter is accepted with certainty. If she is indifferent between the two prices and if, in her indifference, she offers with positive probability, then B's posterior belief on observing is less than his prior and he does not accept with certainty. But then a high cost S is not indifferent between these two prices; rather, she prefers .
Because we already know, by Lemma 1, that all o are dominated for a high cost S, this result says that hyper optimism implies that all are dominated for a high cost S. Then for any 
is optimal for either a low or a high cost hyper optimistic S.
. Suppose that B's optimal strategy is such that some such price is optimal for both S types. Then we have b , from which it follows that , which means that for any such price. The contradiction is clear, as for . Now suppose that B's optimal strategy is such that some
is optimal for a low cost S but not for a high cost S. Then we have 0 , 0 p b , implying that , and therefore for any such price, yielding the same contradiction. Now suppose that B's optimal strategy is such that some
is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low cost S. Then we have b , from which it follows that v , meaning that
. However, B's certain acceptance of such a price also induces an optimistic low cost S to set that price, which means that ( ) b 0
, and for any such price, and the familiar contradiction reappears. Hence, when S is hyper optimistic, B's optimal strategy must be such that no
is optimal for either S type.
We have shown that hyper optimism means that no = for , and . Then B's optimal response, , is unique as is a low cost S's optimal price,
. But suppose a low cost S is indifferent between and
is , i.e., .
f We know that the probability with which B must accept is at least , but can he accept with any larger probability? It is easy to see that he cannot, for accepting v with any larger probability yields
and a low cost S is not indifferent. Therefore, B's best response to v is unique, . This also means that B's optimal strategy will leave a hyper optimistic low cost S indifferent between and , i.e.,
, when it happens that . ) and his best responses to such prices. It is clear that any price lower than is dominated for a high cost S, for even if B accepts such a price with certainty, her expected payoff is smaller than that she expects from v when B accepts v with probability . We invoke the Intuitive Criterion to set b for any such price. Given this belief, we have , implying for any
, which makes any such price suboptimal for a low as well as a high cost S, as required. The Intuitive Criterion loses its bite, however, for prices at least as high as because such prices are not dominated for either S type if B accepts with sufficiently large probability. We therefore assume that these prices are uninformative, i.e., b = for all such prices. Given this belief, and since , we have , so for any
, which makes any such price suboptimal for both S types, as required.
(ii) The conditions that define a very optimistic S are ) and ( ) π 1 when v is accepted with probability , even if is accepted with certainty. Proving this part of the lemma requires us to
show that all o ) must be suboptimal for both S types, from which it follows that is optimal for a high cost S given the above-stated relationship between her payoffs from and v . We must also show that B's response to a high cost S's price must be smaller than , making p the optimal price for a low cost S.
First, note that precisely the same result given above for the case of also applies here, i.e., a high cost S strictly prefers to when the former is accepted with probability and the latter is accepted with certainty. Hence, all are suboptimal for a very optimistic high cost S. So, as before, for any , and therefore
This is a contradiction, as v is suboptimal for a very optimistic low cost S when B's response to this price is . 
We now consider B's beliefs on observing and best responses to zero probability prices. By Lemma 1 we know that b for any 
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The next three proofs are those of the equilibria given by Propositions 2, 3, and 4. These proofs focus on showing that deviations from the stated equilibria are not profitable for the seller. The logic underlying the buyer's strategies is stated by the results that precede these three proofs, and when one of those results is used in the proof of one of the following propositions, we clearly reference it to help the reader understand why it applies in the current context.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. (i) By definition, if the seller is moderately pessimistic and
, then a low cost seller's expected payoff from offering any first period price that she would offer were her cost high, given that B is sufficiently likely to accept such a price, exceeds her payoff from take-the-sure-thing. That is, , because, by Lemma 1, we know that means that
, and that if the seller's cost is high she never offers a price below . (4) Accept if the first period price is less than or equal to , which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief.
Consider a deviation by the seller. Can she profit by deviating to a lower first period offer? By Lemma 1 we know that it is never profitable for the seller to offer any is certain to accept . Therefore, whether her cost is low or high, it is not profitable for the seller to deviate to any .
Can the seller profit by deviating to a higher first period offer? To see that she cannot we note that the proof of Lemma 3 shows that B's threat to reject any is credible, so any such price is certain to be rejected. Now, observe that if B rejects such a price, then if a moderately pessimistic low cost seller makes such an offer her payoff
, and it is easy to show that this is smaller than 
Now consider the case when the seller is moderately optimistic. We know by Lemmas 1, 2, and 4 that under this condition B's optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Next we show that the seller does not profit by deviating to a higher first period offer if her cost is low. To do so, we need to show that if a high cost seller's payoff from o is larger than it is from v (and, hence, any offer in p
, then the same is true about a low cost seller's payoff. If the seller's cost is low, then straightforward algebra shows that her expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering exceeds that from gambling by offering v (when B is certain to accept and accepts v with probability ) if Straightforward algebra shows that inf requires that v , which requires that either b or
, all of which are ruled out by assumption. Therefore, , which implies that a low cost seller does not deviate to a first period offer higher than if a high cost seller does not, and we have already established that a moderately optimistic high cost seller does not.
(ii) By the definition of hyper optimism, the seller is hyper optimistic when , and both of the following conditions hold.
(1) A low cost seller's expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering , which B is certain to accept, is no more than is her expected payoff from gambling by offering v , when B accepts with probability . (2) A high cost seller's expected payoff from offering v , which B accepts with probability , is at least as large as is her expected payoff from offering if B accepts with certainty. Observe that because increases in
, it follows that the strict inequality, , implies that a low cost seller's payoff from gambling by offering v strictly exceeds her payoff from learn-then-discriminate with an offer of . ] with probability when the seller is hyper optimistic, in which case his updated belief about the seller is the same as his prior, i.e., b . And, whatever his or the seller's belief, we know by Lemma 2 that B is certain to accept any .
=
Consider a deviation by the seller to a lower first period offer. It is clear that no deviation to any ) can be profitable for the seller whether her cost is low or high since no such offer is accepted with any greater probability than is v , and all yield smaller margins. B is certain to accept an offer of , yet the expected payoff for a low cost seller is less than that she expects from an offer of v , and as
, we know by Lemma 1 that a high cost seller does not profitably deviate to (or any lower offer). And, by Lemma 2, we know that, when optimistic, a low cost seller's expected payoff from exceeds that from any lower offer, implying that the payoff from all prices lower than are smaller than is that from v . Hence, whatever her cost, a hyper optimistic seller does not profitably deviate to a first period offer lower than v .
p
It is clear that a deviation to a price higher than v cannot be profitable since at any such price there is certain rejection, while is accepted with probability .  (i.e., B takes all such offers as proof that the seller's cost is low because they are lower than min p , the lowest offer that a high cost seller would ever make).
(3) Accept if , which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief. , as no such price is accepted with any greater likelihood than is v and all yield lower margins. And because we know by Lemma 1 that she does not profitably deviate to any
, we can conclude that the seller does not profit from a deviation to a price lower than v if her cost is high. It is also clear that deviating to a price higher than v does not pay, for at any such price there is no chance of trade, while at v there is trade yielding a positive margin with positive probability. Therefore, a hyper optimistic high cost seller does not profitably deviate from offering v .
+
Now consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low. As no offer is accepted with any greater likelihood than is , offering a lower price cannot be more profitable. It is easy to show that, when hyper pessimistic, takethe-sure-thing, the payoff from which is
, dominates offering any , the payoff from which is shows that B's threat to reject any is credible when the seller is very pessimistic. Therefore, offering any
(at least weakly) dominates offering any , as at any of the former there is trade yielding nonnegative margins with positive probability while at any of the latter there is no chance of trade.
Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low. It is by now clear that she does not profitably deviate to any offer lower than . It is easy to show that, when very pessimistic, take-the-sure-thing, which pays her (iii) First, recall that moderate pessimism is the condition under which ( ) ( )
with sufficiently large probability. Second, recall that means that . Together, these mean that if the seller's cost is high, she is willing to consider first period offers in the interval
, and if her cost is low, she will also consider making offers from the same interval if B accepts with large enough probability.
Therefore, any offer that the seller would make if her cost is high will be a pooling offer if B accepts with sufficiently large probability. But notice that the highest pooling offer that B is certain to accept, , is unacceptable to the seller if her cost is high because here and . Therefore, there is no price that a high cost seller is willing to offer that B can optimally accept with certainty (see Lemma 3.iii.b for details). B's optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Accept v with any probability, , such that 0 , where is the acceptance probability at which the seller is induced to gamble with an offer of if her cost is low, but below which her payoff from gambling is smaller than it is from take-the-sure-thing. Thus, if , then B's updated
is accepted with any greater likelihood than is , but all yield smaller margins, no such deviation is profitable. It is easy to show that when moderately pessimistic, a low cost seller's expected payoff from gambling with an offer of v , which is
, is smaller than is her payoff from take-the-sure-thing when ( )
, as is the case here. Hence, the seller does not profitably deviate from take-the-sure-thing if her cost is low. Note that B's response here is not unique, as any resonse to v such that
is an equilibrium response.
Finally, observe that because B's response to a high cost seller's offer is not unique, neither is a high cost seller's updated belief about the buyer if her first period offer, v , is rejected. It is important, however, that we establish the boundaries on her updated belief in the event that her offer is rejected. In particular, we must show that the lower boundary of is positive, for if it is zero, a high cost seller withdraws from the interaction under the belief that she cannot trade with the buyer. First, because B accepts with positive probability, we know by Bayes' (iv) Recall that the seller is very optimistic when the following conditions hold.
(1) A low cost seller's expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering , which B is certain to accept, exceeds that from gambling by offering v , if B accepts v with probability . And (2) a high cost seller's expected payoff from offering v is at least that from offering if B accepts the former with probability and the latter with certainty.
By Lemma 4.ii we know that when the seller is very optimistic, B's optimal strategy is as follows.
(1) Accept v with any probability,
, where is the acceptance probability at which a low cost seller's expected payoff from gambling equals that from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering , but below which learn-then-discriminate by offering dominates gambling. Thus, on seeing that the offer is , B's updated belief is b . (2) Accept all If the seller's cost is low, we know by Lemma 2 that her expected payoff from playing learn-thendiscriminate by offering in the first period exceeds the payoff that is hers if she takes-the-sure-thing by offering (or any lower price) when she is optimistic. And because no ) is accepted with greater likelihood than is , but all yield smaller margins, she does not profitably deviate to any such offer. Thus, when very optimistic, a low cost seller does not profitably deviate to any price lower than . Now let us consider the possibility that she profits from offering a higher price. First, it is clear that it is not profitable for her to offer any since at any
such price there is no chance of trade. Second, it is easy to show that when very optimistic, a low cost seller's expected payoff from offering , which is 
is an equilibrium response. is the initial buyer reputation (equivalently, the initial seller belief) at which a low cost seller's expected payoff from offering n equals that from take-the-sure-thing if B is certain to accept min . Also, recall that means that . Hence, if B is certain to accept , then a low cost seller's expected payoff from offering this price is the same as it is from take-the-sure-thing. Finally, recall that when the seller is moderately pessimistic and , B's optimal strategy is described in the proof of Proposition 2.i.
Given that B's strategy is precisely the same as is given in the proof of Proposition 2.i, for the same reasons that the seller does not profitably deviate if her cost is high there, she does not deviate here if her cost is high. If the seller's cost is low, deviating to a higher price is not profitable for the same reasons given in the proof of Proposition 2.i. But, for a moderately pessimistic low cost seller, implies that the expected payoff from playing learnthen-discriminate by offering , which is [ , equals the payoff from take-thesure-thing, which is
. She is therefore completely indifferent between these two strategies, and any ] is optimal. Note also that the fact that any ] is optimal for the seller if her cost is low affects B's updated belief, ), on observing an offer of (specifically, as 1 increases, so does ( ) with sufficiently large probability, on observing any such offer the buyer's updated belief is still the same as his prior. His optimal response to any is likewise unchanged: he rejects them. As a result, if the seller's cost is high, the unique optimal strategy for her is to offer . . This, however, has no effect on B's strategy, for if he accepts v with any larger probability than , a low cost seller is no longer indifferent between and , and we encounter the contradictions described in the proof of Corollary 2. And if he accepts v with any smaller probability than , a high cost seller reduces her offer slighly, and again we encounter the contradictions described in the proof of Corollary 2. 
